A fundamental open problem in the area of blockchain protocols is whether the Bitcoin protocol is the optimal solution (in terms of eciency, security) for building a secure transaction ledger. A recently proposed and widely considered alternative is the GHOST protocol which, notably, was proposed to be at the core of Ethereum as well as other recent proposals for improved Bitcoin-like systems. The GHOST variant is touted as oering superior performance compared to Bitcoin (potentially oering block production speed up by a factor of more than 40) without a security loss. Motivated by this, in this work, we study from both a provable security and attack susceptibility point of view the problem of transaction processing time for both GHOST and Bitcoin.
The popularity of Bitcoin [19] has lead to a surge in the interest about its core protocol that maintains a distributed data structure called the blockchain. In [10] , the core of the Bitcoin protocol was abstracted under the moniker Bitcoin Backbone and it was demonstrated to be a powerful tool for solving consensus, [23, 16] , in a synchronous, anonymous and Byzantine setting where (unreliable) broadcast is the communication operation available to the participants, (a problem rst considered in [2, 20] ). In [10] , it was shown that the core protocol provably guarantees two properties: (i) persistence: if a transaction is reported as stable by one node, then it will be also reported as such by any other honest node of the system, (ii) liveness: all honestly generated transactions that are broadcasted are eventually reported as stable by some honest node. This provides a formal framework for proving the security of systems like Bitcoin, since their security can be reduced to the persistence and liveness of the underlying transaction ledger. Furthermore, it provides a way to argue formally about transaction conrmation time since the liveness property is equipped with a delay parameter that species the maximum transaction delay that can be caused by an adversary.
Naturally, implementing a robust transaction ledger may be achieved in various other ways, and it is a fundamental open question of the area whether the Bitcoin protocol itself is an optimal implementation of a robust transaction ledger. Indeed, many researchers have challenged various aspects of the Bitcoin system and they have proposed modications in its core operation. Some of the modied systems maintain the protocol structure but modify the hard-coded parameters (like the block generation rate) or the basic primitives, e.g., the way proof of work is performed (a number of alternative proof of work implementations have been proposed using functions like scrypt [24] , lyra2 [26] and others). However, more radical modications are possible that alter the actual operation of the protocol.
One of the most notable such variants is the GHOST protocol, which was suggested by Sompolinsky and Zohar in [27] . After the initial suggestion many cryptocurrencies using variants of the GHOST rule were proposed and implemented. The most popular among them, Ethereum [7] has received substantial research attention [15, 14, 4, 25, 12, 21] . Ethereum is essentially a Bitcoin-like system where transaction processing is Turing-complete and thus it can be used to implement any public functionality in a distributed way. Bitcoin-NG [8] is another popular Bitcoin-like system relying on GHOST that separates blocks in two categories, namely key blocks and microblocks, reecting the fact that transaction serialization and leader election may be separated.
Unfortunately, the security analysis of [27] is not as general as [10] (e.g., their attacker does not take advantage of providing conicting information to dierent honest parties), while the analysis of [10] does not carry to the setting of GHOST. This is because the GHOST rule is a natural, albeit radical, reformulation of how each miner determines the main chain. In GHOST, miners adopt blocks in the structure of a tree. Note that in both Bitcoin and GHOST one can consider parties collecting all mined blocks in a tree data structure. However, while in Bitcoin the miners would choose the most dicult chain as the main chain, in GHOST, they will determine the chain by greedily following the heaviest observed subtree. This means that for the same subtree, a Bitcoin miner and a GHOST miner may choose a completely dierent main chain. Furthermore, it means that the diculty of the main chain of honest parties does not necessarily increase monotonically (it may decrease at times) and thus a fundamental argument (namely that blockchains monotonically increase) that made the analysis of [10] possible, does not hold anymore.
Our Results. We propose a new analysis framework for blockchain protocols focusing on trees of blocks as opposed to chains as in [10] . Our framework enables us to argue about random variables on the trees of blocks that are formed by the participants. In our framework, we can express concepts like a node being d-dominant, which means that the block corresponding to that node would be preferred by a margin of d compared to other sibling nodes according to a specied weight measure. This actually enables us to unify the description of Bitcoin and GHOST by showing they obey the same rule, but simply for a dierent weight measure.
Using our framework we then provide a rst formal security proof of the GHOST rule for blockchain protocols. Specically, we prove that GHOST is a robust transaction ledger that satises liveness and persistence. We achieve this result, by a new methodology, that reduces the properties of the robust transaction ledger to a single lemma, that we call the fresh block lemma and is informally stated as follows.
Fresh Block Lemma. (Informally) At any point of the execution and for any past sequence of s consecutive rounds, there exists an honest block mined in these rounds, that is contained in the chain of any honest player from this point on.
As we demonstrate, the fresh block lemma is a powerful tool in the presence of an adversary: we show easily that the properties of the robust transaction ledger reduce to it in a black-box fashion.
This provides an alternative proof methodology for establishing the properties of a robust transaction ledger compared to [10] , cf. also [13] , who reduced the properties of the robust transaction ledger to three other properties called common prex, chain quality and chain growth, and may be of independent interest as it could be applicable to other blockchain variants.
Having established the provable security of GHOST, we then ask whether it is a more ecient alternative to bitcoin. The focus for this is the liveness property, and more specically the delay parameter that species the worst-case conrmation time that can be caused by an adversary.
We present a general attack methodology for attacking transaction conrmation time. Our attack method has three stages: (i) the attack preparation stage, (ii) the transaction denial stage and (iii) the blockchain retarder stage. In the attack preparation stage, our attacker prepares the attack and waits for the transaction that she dislikes to appear in the network (e.g., the attacker may mine a private chain or may interfere with block adoption of the honest nodes to be at an advantageous position). When the disliked transaction appears, the attacker moves to the transaction denial phase where she tries to prevent honest nodes from adopting it. At any moment, the attacker may switch to the third phase where she gives up on preventing the honest nodes from adopting the transaction and tries to slow down the blockchain growth so that the conrmation time might be extended. Using this template, we present two attacks for Bitcoin and GHOST respectively.
We prove that our attack for Bitcoin is optimal in the sense that the cumulative distribution of delay in Bitcoin transaction processing time, when under our attack, dominates the delay that may be caused by any other attack. It follows that our attack can be used as a yardstick to show whether a protocol can improve blockchain liveness compared to Bitcoin in the following manner: a protocol will enjoy provably better liveness than Bitcoin provided that the delay an arbitrary attacker can cause against the new blockchain protocol is strictly bounded by the delay caused by our attacker against Bitcoin.
Interestingly, the attack we present for GHOST breaks this barrier. The attack is more involved than the corresponding for Bitcoin, as it exploits the way that honest nodes pick the main chain in a way that is intrinsic to the GHOST rule. This enables a powerful blockchain retarder phase that slows down chain growth. We prove that the GHOST protocol, under our attack, is outperformed by Bitcoin (when subjected to the optimal attack) for a wide range of parameter settings and numbers of blocks that one wishes to wait in order to conrm a transaction. Given the practical relevance of our results, we also verify our results experimentally. We observe that the gap between the two protocols in favor of Bitcoin becomes particularly signicant when the number of blocks required for conrmation is very high (at the level that is required by various exchanges 1 ).
Given that the main claims for the GHOST protocol is its alleged superior capability to allow faster transactions compared to Bitcoin, cf. [27] , it is important to reect that this is untrue in the provable sense within our model. We note that, in order to compare apples to apples, we compare the two protocols, GHOST and Bitcoin, using the same equally accelerated block production rate. Comparing the two at an equal rate is justied from our provable security analysis for the persistence property which does not enable us to show a security advantage of GHOST over Bitcoin for accelerated rates; (put dierently, Bitcoin does not appear to lose security at a higher rate than GHOST when accelerated. 2 ) We remark that a number of variants of GHOST have been considered in Ethereum (see [7] ) with the one currently selected being termed uncles-only GHOST for 7 generations. We remark that recently, in [11] , it was suggested that the actual implementation still uses a variant of Bitcoin and resembles GHOST only in the reward mechanism. In any case, we show that our transaction conrmation time attack against GHOST may easily extend to variants such as uncles-only GHOST (albeit with a slightly milder eect). There are other ways to modify GHOST that can be considered (e.g., [17] ) and these may also be cast and analyzed both from a provable perspective in our framework as well as from an attack potential perspective using our attack template.
With the above results, our work provides a rst example of comparative study between dierent blockchain designs from a provable security perspective. We believe that this a fruitful direction which may lead to either future improvements of blockchain protocols or optimality results for the protocols that are already known.
On the generality of the adversarial model. The adversarial model we adopt in this work is the one proposed by Garay et al. [10] . This model is quite general in the sense that, it can captures many attack models that were proposed in the literature. For example, it captures the double spending attacker of [19] , the block withholding attacker of [9] (which can be simulated because the adversary can change the order that messages arrive for each honest player) and the eclipse attacker of [6] where the communication of a portion of the honest nodes in the network is completely controlled (eclipsed) by the adversary (this can be simulated by simply considering the eclipsed nodes to be controlled by the adversary and having the adversary honestly execute their program while dropping their incoming messages). For a quantitative analysis of these attacks the reader is referred to [11] .
Limitations and directions for future research. Our analysis is in the standard Byzantine model where parties fall into two categories, those that are honest (and follow the protocol) and those that are dishonest and may deviate in an arbitrary (and coordinated) fashion as dictated by the adversary. It is an interesting direction for future work to consider the rational setting where all parties wish to optimize a certain utility function. Designing suitable incentive mechanisms, for instance see [18] for a suggestion related to the GHOST protocol, or examining the requirements for setup assumptions, cf. [1] , are related important considerations. Our analysis is in the static setting, i.e., we do not take into account the fact that parties change dynamically and that the protocol calibrates the diculty of the POW instances to account for that; we note that this may open the possibility for additional attacks, say [3] , and hence it is an important point for consideration and future work. While we discover an optimal attack against the liveness property for bitcoin, 1 Kraken and Poloniex are currently the biggest Ethereum exchanges. Kraken initially had used 6000 blocks for conrmation time, while Poloniex 375 blocks. See Figure 7 for experimental results at this level. 1 Currently the Ethereum Frontier reports an average of about 14 seconds, cf. https://etherchain.org; the 12 seconds rate was discussed by Buterin in [5] . In contrast, Bitcoin block generation rate is 10 minutes. 2 We note that even though the analysis of [27] suggests that there is an advantage, their analysis is performed in a much more restricted attack model than ours. the provable security bound for the delay in the liveness property of GHOST is not matched by an attacker. Even though, we demonstrate that our GHOST attacker causes higher delays than Bitcoin for most choices of the parameters, it does not match the worst case provable bound, something that means that the bound might be lowered (or alternatively the attack may be improved). Finally, it is interesting to consider our results in more general models such as the semi-synchronous model of [22] .
Organization. In section 2 we overview the model that we use for expressing the protocols and the theorems regarding the security properties. In section 3 we introduce our new tree-based framework.
Then, in section 4 we present our security analysis of an abstraction of the GHOST protocol that demonstrates it is a robust transaction ledger in the static setting. In section 5 we present our liveness attacks against Bitcoin and GHOST variants, we prove the optimality of the attack against Bitcoin and we compare the two attacks by performing simulations for various parameter choices.
2 Preliminaries and the GHOST Backbone protocol
Model
For our model we adopt the abstraction proposed in [10] . Specically, in their setting, called the q-bounded setting, synchronous communication is assumed and each party is allowedueries to a random oracle. The network supports an anonymous message diusion mechanism that is guaranteed to deliver messages of all honest parties in each round. The adversary is rushing and adaptive. Rushing here means that in any given round he gets to see all honest players' messages before deciding his own strategy. However, after seeing the messages he is not allowed to query the hashing oracle again in this round. In addition, he has complete control of the order that messages arrive to each player. The model is at in terms of computational power in the sense that all honest parties are assumed to have the same computational power while the adversary has computational power proportional to the number of players that it controls.
The total number of parties is n and the adversary is assumed to control t of them (honest parties don't know any of these parameters). Obtaining a new block is achieved by nding a hash value that is smaller than a diculty parameter D. The success probability that a single hashing query produces a solution is p = D 2 κ where κ is the length of the hash. The total hashing power of the honest players is α = pq(n − t), the hashing power of the adversary is β = pqt and the total hashing power is f = α + β. A number of denitions that will be used extensively are listed below.
Denition 1. A round is called:
successful if at least one honest player computes a solution in this round.
uniquely successful if exactly one honest player computes a solution in this round. Denition 3. (chain extension) We will say that a chain C extends another chain C if a prex of C is a sux of C.
In [10] , a lower bound to the probabilities of two events, that a round is successful or that is uniquely successful (dened bellow), was established and denoted by γ u = α − α 2 . While this bound is sucient for the setting of small f , here we will need to use a better lower bound to the probability of those events, denoted by γ, and with value approximately αe −α (see Appendix). Observe that γ > γ u .
2.2
The GHOST Backbone Protocol
In order to study the properties of the core Bitcoin protocol, the term Backbone Protocol was introduced in [10] . On this level of abstraction we are only interested on properties of the blockchain, independently from the data stored inside the blocks. The main idea of the Bitcoin Backbone is that honest players, at every round, receive new chains from the network and pick the longest valid one to mine. Then, if they obtain a new block (by nding a small hash), they broadcast their chain at the end of the round. For more details we refer to [10, Subsection 3.1].
The same level of abstraction can also be used to express the GHOST protocol. The GHOST Backbone protocol, as presented in [27] , is based on the principle that blocks that do not end up in the main chain, should also matter in the chain selection process. In order to achieve this, players store a tree of all mined blocks they have received, and then using the greedy heaviest observed subtree (GHOST) rule, they pick which chain to mine. At every round, players update their tree by adding valid blocks sent by other players. The same principle as Bitcoin applies; for a block to be added to the tree, it suces to be a valid child of some other tree block. The adversary can add blocks anywhere he wants in the tree, as long as they are valid. Again, as on Bitcoin, players try to extend the chains they choose by one or more blocks. Finally, in the main function, a tree of blocks is stored and updated at every round. If a player updates his tree, he broadcasts it to all other players.
The protocol is also parameterized by three external functions V (·), I(·), R(·) which are called: the input validation predicate, the input contribution function, and the chain reading function, respectively. V (·) dictates the structure of the information stored in each block, I(·) determines the data that players put in the block they mine, R(·) species how the data in the blocks should be interpreted depending on the application.
Security Properties
In [10, Denitions 2&3] two crucial security properties of the Bitcoin backbone protocol were considered, the common prex and the chain quality property. The common prex property ensures Algorithm 2 The GHOST backbone protocol, parameterized by the input contribution function I(·) and the reading function R(·). x C is the vector of inputs of all block in chain C.
1: T ← GenesisBlock
T is a tree.
2: state ← ε 3: round ← 0 4: while True do 5 :
state, x ← I(state,C, round, Input(), Receive()) 8 :
11:
Broadcast(head(C new )) 12:
end if 13 :
round ← round + 1
14:
if Input() contains Read then 15: write R(x C ) to Output() 16: end if 17: end while that two honest players have the same view of the blockchain if they prune a small number of blocks from the tail. On the other hand the chain quality property ensures that honest players chains' do not contain long sequences of adversarial blocks. These properties are dened as predicates over the random variable formed by the concatenation of all parties views' denoted by view H(·) Π,A,Z (κ, q, z).
Denition 4 (Common Prex Property). The common prex property Q cp with parameter k ∈ N states that for any pair of honest players P 1 , P 2 maintaining the chains C 1 ,
Denition 5 (Chain Quality Property). The chain quality property Q cq with parameters µ ∈ R and ∈ N states that for any honest party P with chain C in view H(·) Π,A,Z (κ, q, z), it holds that for any consecutive blocks of C the ratio of adversarial blocks is at most µ.
These two properties were shown to hold for the Bitcoin backbone protocol. Formally, in [10, Theorems 9&10] the following were proved: Theorem 6. Assume f < 1 and γ u ≥ (1 + δ)λβ, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1) and λ ≥ 1 such that
Let S be the set of the chains of the honest parties at a given round of the backbone protocol. Then the probability that S does not satisfy the common-prex property with parameter k is at most e −Ω(δ 3 k) .
Theorem 7. Assume f < 1 and γ u ≥ (1 + δ)λβ for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose C belongs to an honest party and consider any consecutive blocks of C. The probability that the adversary has contributed more than (1 − δ 3 ) 1 λ of these blocks is less than e −Ω(δ 2 ) .
Robust public transaction ledger. In [10] the robust public transaction ledger primitive was presented. It tries to capture the notion of a book where transactions are recorded, and it is used to implement Byzantine Agreement in the honest majority setting.
A public transaction ledger is dened with respect to a set of valid ledgers L and a set of valid transactions T , each one possessing an ecient membership test. A ledger x ∈ L is a vector of sequences of transactions tx ∈ T . Each transaction tx may be associated with one or more accounts, denoted a 1 , a 2 , . . . Ledgers correspond to chains in the backbone protocols. An oracle Txgen is allowed in the protocol execution that generates valid transactions (this represents transactions that are issued by honest parties). For more details we refer to [10] . Denition 8. A protocol Π implements a robust public transaction ledger in the q-bounded synchronous setting if it satises the following two properties: Persistence: Parameterized by k ∈ N (the depth parameter), if in a certain round an honest player reports a ledger that contains a transaction tx in a block more than k blocks away from the end of the ledger, then tx will always be reported in the same position in the ledger by any honest player from this round on.
Liveness: Parameterized by u, k ∈ N (the wait time and depth parameters, resp.), provided that a transaction either (i) issued by Txgen, or (ii) is neutral, is given as input to all honest players continuously for u consecutive rounds, then there exists an honest party who will report this transaction at a block more than k blocks from the end of the ledger.
These two properties were shown to hold for the ledger protocol Π PL build on top of the Bitcoin backbone protocol. Formally, in [10, Lemma 15&16] the following were proved:
Lemma 10 (Liveness). Assume f < 1 and γ u ≥ (1 + δ)λβ, for some δ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ [1, ∞) and let k ∈ N. Further, assume oracle Txgen is unambiguous. Then protocol Π PL satises Liveness with wait time u = 2k/(1 − δ)γ u and depth parameter k with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(δ 2 k) .
A unied description of Bitcoin and GHOST backbone
Next, we introduce our new analysis framework for backbone protocols that is focusing on trees of blocks and we show how the description of the Bitcoin and GHOST can be unied. In this model, every player stores all blocks he hears on a tree, starting from a pre-shared block called the Genesis (or v root ) block. This is the model where GHOST was initially described. Bitcoin, and other possible backbone variants, can also be seen in this model and thus a unied language can be built. We rst dene block trees (or just trees) that capture the knowledge of honest players (regarding the block tree on dierent moments at every round). Denition 11. We denote by T P r (resp. T ∃ r ) the tree that is formed from the blocks that player P (resp. at least one honest player) has received until the beginning of round r. Similarly, T + r is the tree that contains T ∃ r and also includes all blocks mined by honest players at round r. For any tree T and block b ∈ T , we denote by T (b) the subtree of T rooted on b.
Notice that, due to the fact that broadcasts of honest players always succeed, blocks in T + r are always in T P r+1 . Thus for every honest player P it holds that:
Intuitively, heavier trees represent more proof of work. However, there is more than one way to dene the weight of a tree. For example, in Bitcoin the heaviest tree is the longest one. On the other hand, for GHOST a heavy tree is one with many nodes. To capture this abstraction we condition our denitions on a norm w that assigns weights on trees. This norm will be responsible for deciding which tree has more proof of work, and thus which tree is favored by the chain selection rule. We choose to omit w from the notation since it will always be clear from the context which norm we use.
Denition 12. Let w be a norm dened on trees. For any tree T let siblings(v) denote the set of nodes in T that share the same parent with v.
The chain selection rule in the Bitcoin protocol can be described using the notion of the ddominant node. Let w(T ) be the height of some tree T . Each player P , starting from the root of his T P r tree, greedily decides on which block to add on the chain by choosing one of its 0-dominant children and continuing recursively 3 (ties are broken based on time-stamp, or based on which block was received rst). Interestingly, the GHOST selection rule can also be described in exactly the same way by setting w to be the number of nodes of the tree. Thus we have a unied way for describing the chain selection rule in both protocols. Building upon this formalism we can describe the paths that fully informed honest players may choose to mine at round r (denoted by HonestPaths(r)) in a quite robust way, thus showcasing the power of our notation.
} We conclude this section by presenting two crucial properties that both the Bitcoin and GHOST backbones satisfy. The rst property states that by broadcasting k blocks the adversary can decrease the dominance of some block at most by k. Intuitively, it tells us if the adversary's ability to mine new blocks is limited, then his inuence over the block tree is also limited. On the other hand, the second property states that uniquely successful rounds increase the dominance only of nodes in the path from the root to the new block.
We will use the term node and block interchangeably from now on. Proposition 13. For the Bitcoin and GHOST backbones protocols it holds that:
If the adversary publishes k ≤ d blocks at round r − 1 then for every block v ∈ T + r−1 it holds
. If r is a uniquely successful round and the newly mined block extends a path in HonestPaths(r), then for any block v in T ∃ r it holds that:
Proof. The lemma stems from the fact that adding only one block in the tree reduces or increases the dominance of some block by at most 1. For the rst bullet, adding k blocks one by one, implies that the dominance of any node will reduce or increase by at most k. For the second bullet, notice that dominance increases only for blocks that get heavier. The only blocks that get heavier in this case are the ones in the path from the root to the newly mined block. Since these blocks are in HonestPaths(r), they are at least 0-dominant and so their dominance will further increase. Furthermore, the newly mined block is 1-dominant since it does not have any siblings. 
Security Analysis and Applications
Next, we prove that the GHOST backbone protocol is sucient to construct a robust transaction ledger. From now on we assume that w(T ) is the total number of nodes of tree T .
4.1
The Fresh Block Lemma
In [10] , it was shown that the Bitcoin Backbone satises two main properties: common prex and chain quality. However, another fundamental property needed for their proof, is that the chains of honest players grow at least at the rate of successful rounds. This does not hold for GHOST. The reason is that, if an honest player receives a chain that is heavier than the one he currently has, he will select it, even if it is shorter. To reect these facts, we develop an argument that is a lot more involved and leads to a power lemma that we call the fresh block lemma.
First, we introduce a new notion, that of a path that all of its nodes are dominant up to a certain value. Intuitively, the more dominant a path is, the harder it gets for the adversary to stop honest players from choosing it.
If no such path exists p dom (r, d) = ⊥.
Note that the dominant path p dom (r, d), if it is not ⊥, will be unique (this stems from the requirement that d > 0).
In the next lemma, we show that unless the number of blocks the adversary broadcasts in a round interval is at least as big as the number of uniquely successful rounds that have occurred, an honest block mined in one of these rounds will be deep enough in the chains of honest players. More specically, for any sequence of m (not necessarily consecutive) uniquely successful rounds starting at some round r , no matter the strategy of the adversary, at round r there will be at least one honest block in p dom (r, m − k) where k is the number of adversarial blocks that have been released during rounds [r − 1, r − 1]. Lemma 15. Let r 1 , .., r m be uniquely successful rounds from round r until round r. If the adversary broadcasts k < m blocks from round r − 1 until round r − 1, then there exists an honest block b, mined in one of the rounds r 1 , .., r m such that b is in p dom (r, m − k).
Proof. We are rst going to prove two preliminary claims that show the eect of a uniquely successful round to p dom . The rst claim shows that if a uniquely successful round s is not compensated accordingly by the adversary, a newly mined block will be forced into p dom (s, 1). Claim 1. Let round s be a uniquely successful round and b be the honest block mined at round s.
If the adversary does not broadcast any block at round s − 1 then b ∈ p dom (s, 1).
Proof of Claim. First, notice that since the adversary does not broadcast any block it holds that for any honest player P , T ∃ s = T P s . Therefore, all nodes in the path from v root to the parent of b are at least 0-dominant in T ∃ s and thus this path is in HonestPaths(s). Since s is uniquely successful, all conditions of the second bullet of Proposition 13 are met, and thus it is implied that all nodes up to the newly mined block in T + s are 1-dominant. It follows that b ∈ p dom (s, 1).
The second claim shows the eect of a uniquely successful round s to an existing p dom (s − 1, d) path. Notice that if the adversary broadcasts less than d blocks the same nodes continue to be at least 1-dominant in the following round. Proof of Claim. There are two cases. In the rst case suppose the adversary broadcasts k < d blocks. Then, according to the rst bullet of Proposition 13, the adversary can lower the dominance in T ∃ s of nodes in p dom (s − 1, d) by at most k. Thus p dom (s − 1, d) will be a prex of all the chains in HonestPaths(s). But because s is a uniquely successful round, the dominance in T + s of all nodes in p dom (s − 1, d) will increase by one. Therefore p dom (s − 1, d) ⊆ p dom (s, d + 1 − k) and b will be a descendant of the last node in p dom (s − 1, d) .
In the second case suppose the adversary broadcasts k = d blocks. If he does not broadcast all of these blocks to reduce the dominance in T ∃ s of the nodes in p dom (s − 1, d), then p dom (s − 1, d) will be a prex of all the chains in HonestPaths(s) and as in the previous case, p dom (s − 1, d) ⊆ p dom (s, d + 1 − k) and b will be a descendant of the last node in p dom (s − 1, d) .
Otherwise the adversary will reduce the dominance in T ∃ s of at least one node in p dom (s − 1, d) to zero. If b is a descendant of the last node in p dom (s − 1, d), then all nodes in p dom (s − 1, d) will be 1-dominant in T + s and p dom (s − 1, d) ⊆ p dom (s, 1) = p dom (s, d + 1 − d). If b is not a descendant of the last node in p dom (s − 1, d) , then for the player P that mined this block it holds that T P s = T ∃ s , because he would have not mined a chain that does not contain p dom (s − 1, d) at round s otherwise. Therefore, P at round s was mining a chain that belonged to HonestPaths(s, v root ) and thus all nodes in the chain are at least 0-dominant in T ∃ s . But because s is a uniquely successful round the dominance of all nodes in the chain that b belongs to will increase by one and thus b ∈ p dom (s, 1). Let b i denote the honest block mined at round r i . Let us assume that r = r m . We are going to prove the lemma using induction on the number of uniquely successful rounds m.
For the base case suppose m = 1. The adversary does not broadcast any block until round r 1 − 1 and from the rst claim b 1 ∈ p dom (r 1 , 1). Thus the base case is proved. Suppose the lemma holds for m − 1 uniquely successful rounds and let k 1 be the number of blocks that the adversary broadcasts in the round interval [r − 1, r m−1 − 1]. We have two cases.
(First case) k 1 = m − 1 and the adversary broadcasts no blocks in the rest of the rounds. From the rst claim it follows that b m ∈ p dom (r m , 1).
(Second case) k 1 < m − 1 and from the induction hypothesis there exist blocks b 1 , ..., b m−1−k 1 mined by honest players at the uniquely successful rounds r 1 , .., r m−1 where b i ∈ p dom (r m−1 , i). Let k 2 be the number of blocks that the adversary broadcasts until round r m − 2 and k 3 the number of blocks he broadcasts at round r m − 1. If k 2 = m − 1 then again from the rst claim it follows that b m ∈ p dom (r m , 1). 1) . This completes the induction proof.
We proved that if k 4 < m is the number of blocks the adversary broadcasts until round r m − 1, then there exists honest blocks b 1 , .., b m−k 4 s.t. b i is in p dom (r m , i). Now in the case r > r m , let k 5 < m − k 4 be the number of blocks the adversary broadcasts in the remaining rounds. The lemma follows easily from the second claim. Remark 1. Let r 1 , .., r m be uniquely successful rounds up to round r and the honest block mined at round r 1 be in p dom (r 1 , 1). If the adversary broadcasts k < m blocks from round r 1 until round r−1, then there exists an honest block b mined in one of the rounds r 1 , .., r m such that b in p dom (r, m−k).
(to see why the remark holds notice that that blocks that the adversary broadcasts before round r 1 aect only the dominant path at round r 1 , and not at the following rounds)
The fresh block lemma is stated next. Informally, it states that at any point in time, in any past sequence of s consecutive rounds, at least one honest block was mined and is permanently inserted in the chain that every honest player adopts, with overwhelming probability on s. Lemma 16. (Fresh Block Lemma) Assume γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1) and f < 1.
Then, for all s ∈ N and r ≥ s it holds that there exists a block mined by an honest player on and after 4 round r − s, that is contained in the chain which any honest player adopts on and after round r with probability 1 − e −Ω(δ 2 s) .
Proof sketch. The diculty of proving this lemma stems from the fact that in GHOST, the chains of honest players are not always strictly increasing. That is, honest players may switch from a longer to a shorter chain. Monotonicity allows us to prove many useful things; for example that the adversary cannot use very old blocks in order to maintain a fork as in [10] .
To overcome this diculty, we rst show that whenever the adversary forces honest players to work on a dierent branch of the block tree, he has to broadcast as many blocks as the ones that where mined on uniquely successful rounds on this branch of the tree. Hence, it is hard for the adversary to force honest players to change branches all the time, and moreover, after s rounds this will be impossible due to the fact that γ ≥ (1 + δ)β. But if all honest players stay on one branch, the blocks near the root of the branch will permanently enter their chains. We show that at least 4 Throughout this work, we only consider executions that run for a polynomial number of rounds in the security parameter κ. one of these blocks will be mined by an honest player. By applying this idea in an iterative manner, the lemma follows.
Due to space limitations, for the proof of the lemma we refer to the Appendix.
A robust public transaction ledger
In [10] it is shown how to instantiate the functions V, R, I so that the resulting protocol, denoted by Π PL , built on top of the Bitcoin backbone, implements a robust transaction ledger (see Appendix, Denition 8) . In this section we show how we can achieve the same goal, using exactly the same instantiation of V, R, I, but on top of the GHOST backbone. We call the resulting protocol, Π GHOST PL .
Having established that every s rounds a fresh and honest block is inserted in the chain of all players, we are in a position to prove the main properties of a robust transaction ledger. Liveness stems from the fact that after s 2 rounds, s fresh honest blocks mined on this interval will be in the chain of any honest player. On the other hand, Persistence is implied by the fact that all honest players share a freshly mined block. This block will stay in their chains for the subsequent rounds, therefore the history until this block has become persistent. But this block cannot be very deep in the main chain, because the number of blocks succeeding it are limited by the total block generation rate.
Lemma 17 (Liveness). Assume γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and f < 1. Further, assume oracle Txgen is unambiguous. Then for all k ∈ N protocol Π GHOST PL satises Liveness with wait time u = k(k + 1) rounds and depth parameter k with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(δ 2 k) .
Proof. We prove that assuming all honest players receive as input the transaction tx for at least u rounds, any honest party at round r with chain C will have tx included in C k . Let E i be the event where no block that is in chain C was computed during rounds [r − (i + 1)k, r − ik] by an honest player. For i ∈ {0, ..., k}, by Lemma 16, E i occurs with probability at most e −Ω(δ 2 k) . Thus, if none of this events holds, it follows that a total of k + 1 honest blocks, each mined in the respective round interval, are in C and the oldest of them should contain tx. Hence, tx is included in C k at round r. By the union bound the probability that E 0 ∨ . . . ∨ E k occurs is at most e −Ω(δ 2 k) and the lemma follows.
Lemma 18 (Persistence). Suppose γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1) and f < 1. Then for all k ∈ N protocol Π GHOST PL satises Persistence with probability 1 − e −Ω(δ 2 k) , where k is the depth parameter.
Proof. Let C be the chain that an honest player adopts at round r. It is sucient to show that the head of C k has been computed before round r − k/((1 + δ)f ), because then from Lemma 16 there exists an honest block computed at least at this round that is on the chain that players adopt from round r and afterwards.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that the head of C k is computed after round r − k/((1 + δ)f ). The length of C cannot be greater than the number of solutions Y obtained from the oracle in this amount of rounds. By the Cherno bound,
It follows that, with probability 1 − e −δ 2 f s/3 , Y < k which is a contradiction and thus the lemma follows.
Corollary 19. The protocol Π GHOST
PL is a robust transaction ledger.
As a nal note, Lemma 16 is sucient to prove Persistence and Liveness in a black-box way.
Compared to the approach of [10] , that was further expanded in [13] and [22] , only one property, instead of three, of the underlying backbone protocol suces in order to get a robust public transaction ledger in a black-box manner. On the other hand, the three properties described in these works, common-prex, chain quality and chain growth, also serve as metrics of the eciency of the underlying mechanism and provide more information than the fresh block lemma.
Liveness Attacks
In this section we introduce and analyze a novel class of attacks on the transaction conrmation time of blockchain protocols, and compare the Bitcoin and GHOST protocols from the point of view of these attacks. The attacks we consider try to delay as much as possible the conrmation time (Denition 8) of a target transaction and follow the template depicted in Figure 2 .
First, at the attack preparation phase, the attacker tries to build a potential advantage against honest players, until the time the target transaction tx is broadcast. For instance, the adversary may build a private chain. Next, in the transaction denial phase, the attacker tries to delay a new honest block containing tx from entering honest players' chains. When the attacker decides that further delay is improbable, it may proceed to the blockchain retarder phase, where it tries to decrease the rate at which the chain containing tx grows. Remember, that the verier waits until tx is buried k blocks deep in order to accept a transaction. Therefore, by slowing down the rate at which chains grow, conrmation time is further delayed.
In the following sections we will provide two instantiations of this attack template in the case of Bitcoin and GHOST. We will prove the attack against Bitcoin to be optimal and we will compare it with the attack against GHOST. In this respect, we will prove that the GHOST attack slows down transaction conrmation time substantially more than the Bitcoin can be possibly slowed down for a range of parameters. We also experimentally validate this result for a wide set of parameters. 
5.1
On Bitcoin Liveness First, we are going to analyze an attack based on this template against Bitcoin. We are going to present the three phases of the attack separately. In the attack preparation phase, honest players want to ensure that at the point the target transaction is released, they would have the maximum advantage. Advantage here is interpreted as the number of blocks the adversary's secret chain is ahead compared to the honest players' chains. Interestingly, the well known selsh mining attack [9] , where the attacker (1) tries to mine a secret chain ahead of the honest players, and when they surpass him, he adopts their chain and (2) only broadcasts blocks from his chain when the honest parties have mined a block in the same height, has exactly this property. So until tx is released the attacker executes this type of selsh mining attack.
Next, in the transaction denial phase, the attacker tries to extend for as long as possible the secret chain he built in the previous phase, while not helping honest parties catch up. He does this by only mining blocks on his secret chain that do not contain tx, and selectively broadcasting his blocks only when the honest parties have mined a block on the same height. The dierence with the previous phase is that the attacker persists on extending the longest chain that does not contain tx, instead of trying to extend the longest one among all chains. For the blockchain retarder phase, the attacker is not going to do anything specic, since, as we will see, it already during the transaction denial phase plays optimally regarding to the chain growth speed. Hence, he can stay at the transaction denial phase until the attacker deems that it is impossible that its private chain is going be selected by any honest player.
In a more compact form our attack goes as follows: (1) the attacker runs a type of selsh mining until tx is released, (2) afterwards it tries to extend its private chain as much as possible, while not including tx on its blocks, and broadcasting parts of its chain only when the honest parties mine blocks on the same height.
In order to show the optimality of our attack we focus our attention to the random variable u Π A , which is the time a specic transaction tx takes to be conrmed in an execution where honest players run protocol Π against some attacker A. We are going to consider executions on the qbounded synchronous setting (see Section 2), with the additional restriction that the environment at a specic time t 0 releases the target transaction tx to the network. Therefore, the sample space of u Π A contains the aforementioned executions against attacker A and that is what we mean anytime some probability involving u Π A appears in the text from now on. We next show that our attack is optimal against Bitcoin.
Let A BTC be the attacker we described above and Π PL the ledger version of the Bitcoin Backbone mentioned in Section 4.2.
Theorem 20. For any attacker A against protocol Π PL , it holds that for any positive k P r[u Π PL ABTC > k] ≥ P r[u Π PL A > k] Proof. Let X e be the sequence of uniquely successful rounds in some execution e and Z e be the the sequence of the number of blocks mined by the adversary at each round in the same execution. Let A BTC be the attacker described above and A be an arbitrary attacker. We are going to rst prove that for executions e 1 and e 2 against attackers A BTC and A respectively, if (X e 1 , Z e 1 ) = (X e 2 , Z e 2 ) then the conrmation time of some transaction tx in e 1 , denoted by u Π PL ABTC (e 1 ), is at least equal to u Π PL A (e 2 ).
Let C be the chain of some honest player that conrms transaction tx at e 2 , and b 2 be the block of C that contains tx and was mined at round t 2 . Without loss of generality suppose that b 2 was mined by an honest player. Let b 3 be the last honest block in C before b 2 , that was mined at round t 3 and is at height l 3 . Then by round t 2 all honest players will have received a chain of length l 2 = l 3 + t 2 −1 i=t 3 +1 X e 2 i , where X i is 1 if i is a successful round and 0 otherwise. Since b 2 is honest, the chain the honest miner extended must have had height at least equal to l 2 , otherwise no honest player would have selected this chain. Also, all blocks between b 3 and b 2 are by denition adversarial and also descendants of b 3 . Hence, it follows that they were mined after round t 3 and are at least
i . Notice also, that round t 3 should be before round t 0 , otherwise b 3 would contain tx, which is a contradiction.
Let chain C be the chain of some honest player that conrms transaction tx at e 1 , and b 1 be the block of C that contains tx. We will argue that for attacker A BTC it holds that if there exists some round t 3 before t 0 such that the blocks mined by the adversary up to round t 2 − 1 are more than the number of uniquely successful rounds in the same period, then b 1 will be mined at least at round t 2 . From round t 3 until round t 0 − 1, the adversary runs selsh mining and thus at round t 0 he has a secret chain that exceeds the chain of any honest player by Z t 3 ,t 0 −1 − X t 3 ,t 0 −1 (if positive) blocks, where the random variables represent the blocks mined by the adversary during rounds [t 3 , t 0 − 1] and the number of successful rounds respectively. Since Z t 3 ,t 2 −1 ≥ X t 3 ,t 2 −1 it follows that X t 0 ,t 2 −1 ≥ Z t 3 ,t 0 −1 − X t 3 ,t 0 −1 + Z t 0 ,t 2 −1 and for the remaining rounds the adversary will be able to maintain a secret chain that is as big as the chain of any honest player and thus eectively block tx from entering the chain of any honest player.
Since the condition we argued about holds the sequences (X e 2 , Z e 2 ), it will also hold for (X e 1 , Z e 1 ) an thus b 1 is going to be mined at least at round t 2 . Moreover, A BTC never helps honest parties lengthen their chains more than the number of successful rounds. Therefore, the chains of honest players in execution e 1 , grow at least as slow as in e 2 , and thus u Π PL ABTC (e 1 ) ≥ u Π PL A (e 2 ). It follows that:
But for any executions e it holds that X e is independent of the strategy of the adversary.
Moreover, we can assume without loss of generality that all adversaries spend all their queries at the random oracle at each round without asking the same query twice. In this case, Z e is also independent of the strategy of the adversary. Thus for any (x, z), the probability that (X e , Z e ) = (x, z) in some execution e is the same, independently of the adversary's strategy. Hence: where the probabilities are taken over all executions against attackers A and A BTC respectively. The rst equality follows from the law of total probability. The inequality follows from Inequality 1.
5.2

On GHOST Liveness
Having described the optimal attack against Bitcoin we turn our attention to GHOST. GHOST was designed to prevent selsh-mining type of attacks. Hence, the attack we described for Bitcoin is going to be much less ecient against GHOST. Instead, a weak point of the protocol is that the length of honest players' chains is not strictly increasing as time goes by. The key idea of our scheme is that the attacker tries to reduce the speed that the chains of honest players grow (also referred to as chain growth speed) and thus is named the GHOST-retarder attack. By succeeding, it can eectively decrease the transaction conrmation time for any observer waiting for a transaction to be k blocks deep in his chain.
The rst two stages of our attack are similar to the attack against Bitcoin: the attacker rst runs a selsh mining attack against GHOST, trying to build maximum advantage until tx is released, and then tries to extend his secret chain so that the time that honest parties adopt a chain that contains tx is delayed. When honest miners adopt a chain that is longer than his private chain the adversary proceeds to the blockchain retarder phase.
Algorithm 3 The pseudocode of the adversary during the blockchain retarded phase of the attack against the liveness of GHOST with parameter τ (τ must be greater or equal to 3).
The weight of the competing trees. In the blockchain retarder phase the attacker exploits the fact that in GHOST thin and long trees may have the same or less weight than short and wide trees (see Figure 3 ). So in this phase, the goal of the adversary is to mine, in secret, a subtree of height two that is heavier than the naturally longer subtree that the honest players are mining by themselves. If the adversary's subtree gets heavier, he can publish it and following the GHOST rule force the honest players to switch to a shorter chain.
By doing this repeatedly, every time starting from a recently mined block, and by restarting if honest miners get too far ahead, a concrete reduction of the chain growth speed is achieved.
This will be exploited in the proposition below. It is also presented experimentally in Figure 5 . A more detailed description of the blockchain retarder phase of our attack is given in Appendix and 
We rst focus on E[u Π GHOST PL AGHOST ]. Let the random variable NB(τ, 1 − p) denote the number of i.i.d. Bernoulli trials, with probability of success 1 − p, until τ failures occur. The random variable will follow the well known negative binomial distribution. It holds that: Figure 3 : The fundamental idea of our attack. The adversary tries to mine in secret subtree T 2 , before the honest players mine subtree T 1 . Observe that T 2 has the same weight as T 1 , despite being shorter. race 1 race 2 race 3 where I 1−p (k + 1, τ ) is the regularized incomplete beta function.
Suppose that we launch the blockchain retarder the attack described previously with parameter τ (see Algorithm 3); the adversary tries to mine a short and wide tree with τ nodes before the honest players manage to mine a tree with the same number of nodes. Let E 1 be the event where the number of rounds that the adversary needs in order to mine τ blocks is less than s, and E 2 be the event where the number of rounds that the honest parties needs to have τ successes is more than s. Then, if E 3 is the event where the adversary wins the race and forces honest players to a shorter chain that has grown only by two blocks after s rounds (see Figure 3 ), it holds that:
The last equality follows from the fact that the two events are independent. For f = 0.3, α = 0.17, β = 0.13, p < 10 −4 , s = 37 and τ = 6 we get that P r[E 3 ] ≥ 0.14.
Let random variable R i be equal to 1 if A wins race i and 0 otherwise; we start counting i from the rst race after tx has been broadcast. From our previous argument it holds that P r[R i = 1] ≥ 0.14.
We are going to calculate a lower bound on E[u Π GHOST PL AGHOST ]. Let random variable N be the number of races that have been completed until some honest players conrms tx. On average the adversary is
On the rest of the races, it should take on average 6/α rounds for honest players to mine 6 blocks. Thus, by the linearity of expectation
In order for some honest party to conrm tx, the chain must have grown by at least k blocks. Hence
Thus, by combining the inequalities we get that
We now turn our attention to the Bitcoin attack. Fix a round t 0 during which a transaction tx is released. Let the random variable F be equal to the minimum round t 1 ≥ t 0 that has the property X t ,t > Z t ,t for any t, t such that t < t 0 ≤ t 1 < t, where X t ,t is the number of uniquely successful rounds between t , t and similarly Z t ,t is the number of blocks mined by the adversary in the same sequence of rounds. Notice, that as we argued in Theorem 20, an honest block containing tx will enter the chains of all honest players permanently at round F . Essentially, the maximum advantage that the adversary will have at round t 0 due to selsh mining, will not be enough so that his secret chain is maintained at the same length as any honest player's chain, and thus a fresh honest block will enter the honest players' chains. Clearly this random variable is independent of k and should have constant in k expected value.
In addition, honest parties need at most k/γ ≤ 6.42k rounds on expectation in order to mine k blocks, where γ is the probability of a successful round. It holds that γ = 1 − (1 − p) q(n−t) ≥ 1 − e −α = 0.156. Thus, it follows that
where the last inequality follows from the fact that E[F ] is constant.
The above result, establishes that GHOST can be delayed substantially more than Bitcoin in the presence of an attacker commanding about 43% of the hashing power as long as the target is not too easy. Note that the expectation becomes worse as k grows, i.e., the stronger the level assurance that is sought by the parties. While this already establishes the lack of eciency of GHOST we explore further via experiments a wider set of parameters.
Experimental evaluation. The above analysis shows GHOST's Liveness is worse than that of Bitcoin in an asymptotic way. Given the importance of these results also from a practical point of view we present an experimental analysis. Our experiments were obtained via simulating a network of honest parties running the respective protocol against an adversary that follows the program of liveness attacks. The simulation operates for a certain number of rounds prior to the transaction to be attacked appears, giving the adversary the ability to perform all three phases of our attack.
We rst examine the rate the honest players' chains grow in the retarder phase of the attacks. The results are shown in Figure 5 where we contrast Bitcoin and GHOST miners' chain growth. Then we proceed to test the complete attacks. Given our asymptotic analysis above, as the depth that a transaction needs to nd itself in a chain in order to be conrmed, denoted by k, grows bigger, we also expect the conrmation time of Bitcoin to become favorable than that of GHOST. This is indeed observed, see Figures 6 and 7 . Our simulation also shows (see Figure 10 ) that the GHOST attack performs worse for β approaching γ compared to the Bitcoin optimal attack. So the critical scenario for the GHOST attack, is an adversary who even though it does not have enough power to break security, it can still use our attack to slow down conrmation times signicantly for the entire network. Since it is not clear whether the GHOST-retarder attack is optimal, it remains an open question whether a more ecient attack on conrmation time can be devised when β approaches γ. This question though might be of lesser interest.
(a) (b) Figure 5 : The rate that the chains of honest players grow against our attacks for f = 1. Note that as the hashing power of the adversary increases both Bitcoin and GHOST speed decrease. However, Bitcoin is clearly favorable to GHOST (a) and in fact the ratio of Bitcoin to GHOST chain speed increases (b).
(a) (b) The adversary again tries to mine a short and wide tree. When it decides to release the short tree it has to mine a block under the short tree, in order to capitalize on the blocks mined previously (see Figure 8 for an example). The score of a chain in uncle-only GHOST, is the score of the last block, and the chain ending in the heaviest block is chosen.
B GHOST Backbone protocol
In this section we present for completeness the remaining procedures of the GHOST backbone protocol.
The function pow is the same as the one dened in [10] . The function update gets a block tree and a set of blocks and returns the updated tree containing all new blocks.
Algorithm 4 The proof of work function, parameterized by q, D and hash functions H(·), G(·).
The input is (x, C). return T 8: end function Figure 9 : Comparison of the lower bounds on the probability of a uniquely successful round, γ and γ u , used respectively in this work and [10] . Notice that γ allows as to argue about security when f is greater than 1. Proof. Let random variable Z s 1 ,s 2 (resp. Z pub s 1 ,s 2 ) denote the number of blocks the adversary computes (resp. broadcasts) from round s 1 until round s 2 , and random variable X s 1 ,s 2 denote the number of rounds that are uniquely successful in the same interval.
We are rst going to prove two preliminary claims. We show that as long as from some round r and afterwards the adversary broadcasts less blocks than the total number of uniquely successful rounds, the chain that any honest player adopts after round r extends p dom (r, X 1,r − Z 1,r ). More generally we can prove the following claim.
Claim 3. Consider any execution such that for all s 2 ≥ s 1 it holds that Z 1,s 2 < X 1,s 2 . Then, the chain that any honest player adopts after round s 1 extends p dom (s 1 , X 1,s 1 − Z 1,s 1 ).
Proof of Claim. Since X 1,s 1 > Z 1,s 1 from Lemma 15 if follows that p = p dom (s 1 , X 1,s 1 − Z 1,s 1 −1 ) = ⊥. As long as the number of blocks that the adversary broadcasts at round s 2 are less than the dominance of the nodes in p in T + s 2 −1 , all honest players at round s 2 will adopt chains containing p. Thus uniquely successful rounds will increase the dominance of these nodes. But since from the assumptions made, Z 1,s 2 < X 1,s 2 , in all rounds after round s 1 , the nodes in p are at least 1-dominant in every T P s 2 where P is an honest player; the claim follows.
Next we will show that if successive u.s. rounds occur such that the blocks mined are on dierent branches, then the adversary must broadcast an adequate number of blocks, as specied below. Proof of Claim. Let b 1 , .., b m denote the honest blocks mined at rounds s 1 , .., s m respectively. We are going to prove the claim for m = 2. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that Z pub s 1 −1,s 2 −1 < X s 1 ,s 2 −1 . By the denition of s 2 , the honest blocks mined on all u.s. rounds until round s 2 − 1 are descendants of b 1 . From Lemma 15 at least one honest block b computed in one of the u.s. rounds in [s 1 , s 2 − 1] will be in p dom (s 2 − 1, X s 1 ,s 2 −1 − Z pub s 1 −1,s 2 −2 ). Since from our hypothesis the adversary will broadcast less than Z pub s 2 −1,s 2 −1 < X s 1 ,s 2 −1 −Z pub s 1 −1,s 2 −2 blocks at round s 2 −1, it is impossible for b 2 not to be a descendant of b and thus of b 1 which is a contradiction. Hence, Z pub Then we can make the same argument as for the base case starting from round s and get that either Z pub s −1,s m+1 −1 > X s ,s m+1 −1 or Z pub s −1,s m+1 −1 = X s ,s m+1 −1 and the honest block mined at round s m+1 will be in p dom (s m+1 , 1). Since Z pub s −1,s m+1 −1 < Z pub sm−1,s m+1 −1 and X s ,s m+1 −1 = X sm+1,s m+1 −1 , by the inequality of the inductive hypothesis the claim follows.
In the second case Z pub s 1 −1,sm−1 = X s 1 ,sm−1 and the honest block b m mined at round s m will be in p dom (s m , 1). From Remark 1 of the proof of claim Lemma 15, for an application of this Lemma from rounds s m until s m+1 − 1 we can count the adversarial blocks starting from round s m . Thus from the same argument as for the base case starting from round s m we get that either Z pub sm,s m+1 −1 > X sm,s m+1 −1 or Z pub sm,s m+1 −1 = X sm,s m+1 −1 and the honest block mined at round s m will be in p dom (s m , 1). By the equality of the inductive hypothesis the claim follows.
Next, we observe that Lemma 15 as well as Claim 3 and 4 can be applied on a subtree of the block tree, if all honest blocks mined after the round the root of the subtree was mined are on this subtree. Observation 1. Let b be an honest block computed at round s 1 that is in the chains adopted by all honest players after round s 2 . Also, suppose that all blocks mined at u.s. rounds after round s 1 are descendants of b. Then the following hold:
1. Regarding applications of Lemma 15 and Claim 4 on the subtree of the block tree rooted on b after round s 1 , we can ignore all blocks that the adversary has mined up to round s 1 .
2. Regarding applications of Claim 3 after round s 2 , we can ignore all blocks that the adversary has mined up to round s 1 .
To see why the observation holds consider the following. Since the adversary receives block b for the rst time at round s 1 + 1, all blocks that the adversary mines before round s 1 + 1 cannot be descendants of b. Regarding the rst point, blocks that are not descendants of b do not aect the validity of Lemma 15 and Claim 4 on the subtree of the block tree rooted on b; this is because blocks that are not descendants of b, do not aect the dominance of the nodes of the subtree rooted at b. Regarding the second point, consider the dominant path at round s 3 > s 2 in the subtree that is rooted on b. Then, this path can be extended up to the root node, since, by our assumption, b is in the chains adopted by all honest players after round s 2 .
We are now ready prove the lemma. First, we are going to dene a set of bad events which we will show that hold with probability exponentially small in s. Assuming these events don't occur we will then show that our lemma is implied, and thus the lemma will follow with overwhelming probability.
Let BAD(s 1 , s 2 ) be the event that X s 1 ,s 2 ≤ Z s 1 ,s 2 . In [10, Lemma 5] , by an application of the Cherno bounds it was proved that assuming that γ ≥ (1 + δ)β for some δ ∈ (0, 1), then with probability at least (1 − e − β 75 δ 2 s )(1 − e − γ 32 δ 2 s ) ≥ 1 − e −(min( β 75 , γ 32 )δ 2 s −ln(2)) for any r > 0, s ≥ s: X r ,r +s −1 > (1 + δ 2 )Z r ,r +s −1
Thus, there exists an appropriate constant = δ 2 min( β 75 , γ 32 ), independent of r, such that it holds that for any r > 0, s ≥ s, BAD(r , r + s − 1) occurs with probability at most e − δ 2 s +ln 2 . From an application of the union bound, we get that for the function g(s) = δ 2 s−ln 2+ln(1−e − δ 2 ), the probability that Until now we have assumed that the execution we are studying is collision-free; no two queries in the oracle return the same value for dierent inputs. Let COLL denote the event where a collision occurs in our execution. The probability of COLL in a polynomial number of rounds, is exponentially small on κ.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that round r 3 is after round r 2 + s. Then (r 3 − 1) − (r 1 + 1) ≥ s and Z r 1 +1,r 3 −1 ≥ X r 1 +1,r 3 −1 . This is a contradiction, since in this case ¬BAD(r 1 ) implies Z r 1 +1,r 3 −1 < X r 1 +1,r 3 −1 . Therefore, r 3 ≤ r 2 + s < r. In addition, notice that ¬BAD(r 1 ) also implies X r 1 +1,r 2 +s > Z r 1 +1,r 2 +s
We are going to apply Lemma 15 and Observation 1 from round r 3 until round r 2 + s in the subtree rooted at b 2 . According to the analysis we made previously there are two cases. In the rst case, Z pub r 1 +1,r 3 −1 > X r 1 +1,r 3 −1 or equivalently Z pub r 1 +1,r 3 −1 ≥ X r 1 +1,r 3 . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that r 3 = r 2 + s. Then Z r 1 +1,r 2 +s−1 ≥ X r 1 +1,r 2 +s . But this is a contradiction, since ¬BAD(r 1 ) implies Inequality 3. Therefore, r 3 < r 2 + s. From Inequality 3: X r 3 +1,r 2 +s ≥ X r 1 +1,r 2 +s − X r 1 +1,r 3 > Z r 1 +1,r k +s − Z pub r 1 +1,r 3 −1 ≥ Z pub r 3 ,r 2 +s
The last inequality, stems from two facts: that we can ignore blocks that were mined before round r 1 + 1 regarding applications of Lemma 15 and also that the blocks that the adversary broadcasts at distinct rounds are dierent (adversaries that broadcast the same block multiple times can be ignored without loss of generality).
In the second case, Z pub r 1 +1,r 3 −1 = X r 1 +1,r 3 −1 and the honest block mined at round r 3 will be in p dom (r 3 , 1). Again from Inequality 3: X r 3 ,r 2 +s = X r 1 +1,r 2 +s − X r 1 +1,r 3 −1 > Z r 1 +1,r k +s − Z pub r 1 +1,r 3 −1 ≥ Z pub r 3 ,r 2 +s
The same analysis holds for all rounds after r 2 + s. By an application of Claim 3, an honest block b, computed in one of the u.s. rounds after round r 2 and before round r, will be in the chains that honest players adopt on and after round r. Since b 2 is the most recently mined block, before round r − s, included in the chain of all honest players, b must have been mined on and after round r − s (since r 3 > r 2 ). Let A be the event that there exists a block mined by an honest player on and after round r − s, that is contained in the chain which any honest player adopts after round r. We have proved that (¬BAD(r 1 )) implies A. Then: Hence, the lemma holds with probability at least 1 − e −g(s) .
